Cheating and rule violations in intercollegiate athletics continue to be relevant issues in many institutions of higher education because they reflect upon the integrity of the institutions in which they are housed, causing concern among many faculty members, administrators, and trustees. Although a great deal of research has documented the numerous rule violations in NCAA intercollegiate athletics, much of it has failed to combine sound theory with practical solutions. The purpose of this study was to examine the possible extensions of (...) the organizational justice framework to the problem of rule violations in intercollegiate athletics. In doing so, the current study examined (a) perceived areas of injustice among coaches at NCAA Division I institutions, (b) avenues by which coaches resolve these injustices, and (c) potential solutions for resolving injustices in an attempt to reduce NCAA violations. Six NCAA Division I basketball coaches from various parts of the country (four from men's teams and two from women's teams) were interviewed using a semi-structured format. Despite the NCAA's efforts to create parity, results showed that coaches perceived several areas of inequities in recruiting, including financial resources and academic standards. The interviewed coaches described several means that are currently used to resolve these inequities and offered recommendations for changes to reduce injustice in the future. (shrink)

Bergson définit le temps par la succession, qui est création de nouveauté. Mais il prend des exemples qui relèvent non de la succession mais de la simultanéité, garante d’une autre différence, entre deux choses qui coexistent en même temps, c’est-à-dire l’individualité. Dans Le Rire, on trouve en outre un type de comique qui joue sur la duplication simultanée du même. Ces cas de comique engagent la différence entre la simultanéité naturelle d’individus différents et la simultanéité artificielle d’êtres identiques. Si la (...) simultanéité mécanique du même fait rire, c’est bien que la simultanéité naturelle fonde les différences. Cet oubli de Bergson est d’autant plus surprenant que sa conception du temps repose sur une critique de celle de Kant, lequel avait précisément inclus la simultanéité dans le temps comme un de ses modes ; garant du « divers simultané ». Finalement, Bergson est contraint par sa controverse avec Einstein à réintégrer la simultanéité dans le temps. (shrink)

Access to investigational drugs is a concern to patients and regulatory agencies. In order to determine potential trial participants’ views on access to investigational drugs, we surveyed one hundred people who had been referred to a phase I clinical trial. Most respondents indicated that patients had a right to investigational drugs, that the drugs should be offered only in the context of research, that getting access to these drugs is too hard, and that knowing the right people and being persistent (...) increased the likelihood of gaining access. Respondents did not think that investigational drugs should be given to anyone who wanted them, or that physicians were aware of the latest investigational agents. They most frequently recommended two allocation criteria: offering investigational drugs to those who would benefit most or were most needy; and allocating them to maximize scientific advancement. Respondents who understood the purpose of the trial were more likely to choose the second criterion. (shrink)

Ce texte avance une hypothèse sur ce qui fait la spécificité de l’herméneutique, et sur la façon dont elle peut être située dans le paysage de pensée contemporain. Les deux auteurs convoqués sont Gadamer et Derrida. Partant d’une certaine position de Derrida relativement à la question de l’interprétation, on s’efforce d’en évaluer la pertinence à la lumière de Gadamer. Les perspectives de pensée ouvertes par Gadamer se laissent-elles ranger dans le cadre dessiné par Derrida, ou peuvent-elles servir d’instruments pour ébranler (...) ce cadre ?This text puts forward a hypothesis regarding what constitutes the specificity of hermeneutics, and on how it can be situated in the landscape of contemporary thought. The two authors dealt with are Gadamer and Derrida. We will start from a position held by Derrida concerning the question of interpretation, and examine this position in the light of Gadamer’s writings. Do the perspectives offered by Gadamer simply fall into the framework drawn out by Derrida, or can they serve as means to destabilize this very framework ? (shrink)

Les données dont on dispose sur les apparitions mariales du xixe et du début du xxe siècle montrent que les visionnaires de sexe féminin sont largement majoritaires, à l’inverse des apparitions médiévales qui ont laissé des traces dans les archives. Cette féminisation participe de la « féminisation du catholicisme » qui caractérise le xixe siècle, mais elle ne concerne cependant pas toutes les femmes : les visionnaires reconnues par les catholiques et leur Église sont presque exclusivement des fillettes et des (...) jeunes filles. C’est l’indice d’une valorisation renforcée de la virginité féminine par l’Église catholique, qui contribue à renforcer la proximité entre « la Vierge et ses filles ». (shrink)

Les statues de la Vierge qui sont l'objet d'une dévotion particulièrement intense ont été et sont encore, dans bien des régions de l'Europe catholique, habillées de vêtements réels. La coutume réserve presqu'exclusivement à des femmes le droit de les changer, et donc de voir et de toucher le corps de la statue. L'Église, pourtant, n'accorde qu'aux prêtres le droit de manipuler les objets sacrés, et les femmes, on le sait, ne peuvent accéder à la prêtrise. Comment comprendre, par conséquent, que (...) les « chambrières » de la Vierge soient des femmes? Comment assument-elles leur fonction et quel sens lui donnent-elles? (shrink)

Les statues de la Vierge qui sont l'objet d'une dévotion particulièrement intense ont été et sont encore, dans bien des régions de l'Europe catholique, habillées de vêtements réels. La coutume réserve presqu'exclusivement à des femmes le droit de les changer, et donc de voir et de toucher le corps de la statue. L'Église, pourtant, n'accorde qu'aux prêtres le droit de manipuler les objets sacrés, et les femmes, on le sait, ne peuvent accéder à la prêtrise. Comment comprendre, par conséquent, que (...) les « chambrières » de la Vierge soient des femmes ? Comment assument-elles leur fonction et quel sens lui donnent-elles ? (shrink)

Organe de l’Instituto de Estudios de la Mujer (Institut d’Études sur la Femme) de Grenade, la revue Arenal contient des varia (recensions, articles divers, annonces etc.) et un dossier thématique. Intitulé, dans cette livraison, « Genre et imaginaire religieux : Marie et les femmes », il est coordonné par Angela Muñoz Fernández, qui a signé aussi un de ses articles les plus stimulants. On regrette qu’elle n’ait pas rédigé une présentation générale du numéro ; sa problématique est, cependant,...

Au centre des fêtes patronales de la haute vallée d’Ossau, celles de Laruns et Bielle plus particulièrement, forment une manifestation que le visiteur est tenté de qualifier de folklorique : des danses traditionnelles, exécutées sur la place centrale par des hommes et des femmes vêtus d’un costume également traditionnel. Ce costume, particulièrement celui des femmes, est très valorisé localement. Le but de cet article est de comprendre les raisons de cette valorisation. On y montre que le processus de folklorisation des (...) coutumes de la vallée, qui commence dès le milieu du xixe siècle et a été une des conditions de leur conservation, n’a pas ôté tout sens social au costume de fête : les femmes, ou une partie d’entre elles, ne le mettent pas seulement pour offrir un beau spectacle aux touristes venus voir les danses ossaloises mais parce qu’il cristallise l’histoire familiale et locale. La jupe rouge témoignerait ainsi du statut privilégié des femmes dans le passé de la société ossaloise. (shrink)

Ce livre consacré aux apparitions de Medjugorje, un bourg de Bosnie-Herzégovine, dans l’ex-Yougoslavie, s’ouvre sur le portrait d’un homme qui, frappé d’amnésie, ne sait plus où il se trouve et ne cesse de s’en enquérir auprès de tous ceux qu’il rencontre : les réponses qu’il obtient le perdent davantage : « Vous êtes chez la Sainte Vierge », « Vous êtes à Medjugorje », « Vous êtes en Bosnie », « Vous êtes dans un pèlerinage ». S’il avait pu s’adresser (...) aux habitants du village en parlant leur... (shrink)

Empirical research has distinguished moral judgments that focus on an act and the actor’s intention or mental states, and those that focus on results of an action and then seek a causal actor. Studies indicate these two types of judgments may result from a “dual-process system” of moral judgment (Cushman 2008, Kneer and Machery 2019). Results-oriented judgements may be subject to the problem of resultant moral luck because different results can arise from the same action and intention. While some (...) argue luck should not bear on persons’ culpability, Victor Kumar has argued that the tendency to hold unlucky agents responsible for harm is justified by consequentialist aims of punishment (Kumar 2019). In contrast, judgments that focus on acts and intentions may be primarily retributive. Kumar claims that judgments focused on results track external, public harm because this increases the reliability of punishment and better achieves instrumental aims, including deterrent effect. In this chapter I examine rape cases using Kumar’s theory of punishment. Rape involves outcomes that are not publicly available. If judgments of punishment depend on outcomes, then we would expect such judgments to be less stable for those instances of wrongdoing that lack public outcomes such as rape, because such judgments would rely instead on often biased and unreliable inferential processes to establish the presence of mental states, which are essentially private. In this way Kumar’s theory actually predicts the way in which we see criminal justice institutions fail with regard to arrest, prosecution, and punishment related to rape; and we might expect similar failures for other crimes that lack publicly available results. In sum, a fundamental problem with institutionalized punishment centered upon results may be that some crimes sit within a moral blindspot. (shrink)

Cushman's theory has implications for the philosophical debate about the nature of folk psychological states, for it entails realism about propositional attitudes. I point out a tension within his view and suggest a different view upon which rationalization emerges as a consequence of the adaptiveness of mentalizing. This alternative avoids the strong metaphysical implications of Cushman's theory.

à la veille des élections présidentielles françaises dans lesquelles ne concourront, comme c’est désormais traditionnel sous la Cin-quième République, qu’une extrême minorité de femmes, l’ouvrage de Marlène Coulomb-Gully revient sur l’inégal partage du pouvoir entre les sexes. En six chapitres qui présentent l’avantage d’être à la fois accessibles à tou.te.s et très documentés, l’auteure dresse un panorama de ce déficit démocratique pour en souligner les facteurs, les manifestations mais égal...

This article is drawn from my translation of Zarader's *Heidegger et la dette impensée*. I explore both Zarader and J. Derrida's (De l'esprit) investigations into Heidegger's recourse to "Old Testament" and Judaic logics (including apophatics) in his quest for the origins of religiosity.

An extensive body of research suggests that the distinction between doing and allowing plays a critical role in shaping moral appraisals. Here, we report evidence from a pair of experiments suggesting that the converse is also true: moral appraisals affect doing/allowing judgments. Specifically, morally bad behavior is more likely to be construed as actively ‘doing’ than as passively ‘allowing’. This finding adds to a growing list of folk concepts influenced by moral appraisal, including causation and intentional action. We therefore suggest (...) that the present finding favors the view that moral appraisal plays a pervasive role in shaping diverse cognitive representations across multiple domains. (shrink)

À propos du livre récent de Marlène Albert Llorca, Les Vierges miraculeuses, l’auteur survole rapidement les conclusions de recherches récentes sur l’image religieuse dans l’Europe traditionnelle. Il examine les manières dont les dévots convertissent des images en objets cultuels en les associant à des laïcs importants et aux sanctuaires qui les accueillent. Il commente les conclusions d’Albert Llorca selon lesquelles ces images, vêtues pour la circonstance, peuvent servir à répliquer le “miracle” originel pour les dévots qui manipulent ces vêtements ; (...) ainsi se rejouent les événements miraculeux censés être à l’origine du charisme de l’image. C’est donc l’imaginaire de la communauté, incarné dans les “cameraras” qui habillent l’image, qui dote celle-ci de pouvoirs miraculeux. (shrink)

��Is moral judgment accomplished by intuition or conscious reasoning? An answer demands a detailed account of the moral principles in question. We investigated three principles that guide moral judgments: (a) Harm caused by action is worse than harm caused by omission, (b) harm intended as the means to a goal is worse than harm foreseen as the side effect of a goal, and (c) harm involving physical contact with the victim is worse than harm involving no physical contact. Asking whether (...) these principles are invoked to explain moral judgments, we found that subjects generally appealed to the first and third principles in their justifications, but not to the second. This finding has significance for methods and theories of moral psychology: The moral principles used in judgment must be directly compared with those articulated in justification, and doing so shows that some moral principles are available to conscious reasoning whereas others are not. (shrink)

We examined the effects of framing and order of presentation on professional philosophers’ judgments about a moral puzzle case (the “trolley problem”) and a version of the Tversky & Kahneman “Asian disease” scenario. Professional philosophers exhibited substantial framing effects and order effects, and were no less subject to such effects than was a comparison group of non-philosopher academic participants. Framing and order effects were not reduced by a forced delay during which participants were encouraged to consider “different variants of the (...) scenario or different ways of describing the case”. Nor were framing and order effects lower among participants reporting familiarity with the trolley problem or with loss-aversion framing effects, nor among those reporting having had a stable opinion on the issues before participating the experiment, nor among those reporting expertise on the very issues in question. Thus, for these scenario types, neither framing effects nor order effects appear to be reduced even by high levels of academic expertise. (shrink)

We examined the effects of order of presentation on the moral judgments of professional philosophers and two comparison groups. All groups showed similar-sized order effects on their judgments about hypothetical moral scenarios targeting the doctrine of the double effect, the action-omission distinction, and the principle of moral luck. Philosophers' endorsements of related general moral principles were also substantially influenced by the order in which the hypothetical scenarios had previously been presented. Thus, philosophical expertise does not appear to enhance the stability (...) of moral judgments against this presumably unwanted source of bias, even given familiar types of cases and principles. (shrink)

Childhood obesity has become a public health epidemic, and currently a battle exists over how to frame and address this problem. This paper explores how public policy approaches can be employed to address obesity. We present the argument that obesity should be viewed as the consequence of a “toxic environment” rather than the result of the population failing to take enough “personal responsibility.” In order to make progress in decreasing the prevalence of obesity, we must shift our view of obesity (...) away from the medical model to a public health model . At the same time, we must be sensitive to the problem of weight bias.Potential obstacles to taking a public policy approach are identified, as well as suggestions on how to overcome them. (shrink)

After years of near total neglect, the problem of childhood obesity is now in the limelight. Terms like “epidemic,” “crisis,” and “emergency” are used frequently when describing the trend. Progress is defined with strong language and fueled by statistics such as the observation that this generation of children will be the first to live shorter lives than their parents. Multi-disciplinary journals such as the Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics have dedicated symposiums to the issue, and conferences have been convened (...) not only by health professionals but by government agencies, the food industry, and even professionals who market to children. The seriousness of childhood obesity is no longer in doubt, and finally attention has turned to the more complex question – what must be done? (shrink)

Research on the capacity to understand others' minds has tended to focus on representations ofbeliefs,which are widely taken to be among the most central and basic theory of mind representations. Representations ofknowledge, by contrast, have received comparatively little attention and have often been understood as depending on prior representations of belief. After all, how could one represent someone as knowing something if one does not even represent them as believing it? Drawing on a wide range of methods across cognitive science, (...) we ask whether belief or knowledge is the more basic kind of representation. The evidence indicates that nonhuman primates attribute knowledge but not belief, that knowledge representations arise earlier in human development than belief representations, that the capacity to represent knowledge may remain intact in patient populations even when belief representation is disrupted, that knowledge (but not belief) attributions are likely automatic, and that explicit knowledge attributions are made more quickly than equivalent belief attributions. Critically, the theory of mind representations uncovered by these various methods exhibits a set of signature features clearly indicative of knowledge: they are not modality-specific, they are factive, they are not just true belief, and they allow for representations of egocentric ignorance. We argue that these signature features elucidate the primary function of knowledge representation: facilitating learning from others about the external world. This suggests a new way of understanding theory of mind – one that is focused on understanding others' minds in relation to the actual world, rather than independent from it. (shrink)

Moral luck is a puzzling aspect of our psychology: Why do we punish outcomes that were not intended (i.e. accidents)? Prevailing psychological accounts of moral luck characterize it as an accident or error, stemming either from a re‐evaluation of the agent's mental state or from negative affect aroused by the bad outcome itself. While these models have strong evidence in their favor, neither can account for the unique influence of accidental outcomes on punishment judgments, compared with other categories of moral (...) judgment. Why might punishment be particularly sensitive to moral luck? We suggest that such sensitivity is easily understood from the broader perspective of punishment's ultimate adaptive goal: Changing others’ behavior by exploiting their capacity to learn. This pedagogical perspective accounts for the exceptional influence of outcomes on punitive sentiments and makes predictions for additional moderators of punishment. We review evidence supporting the pedagogical hypothesis of punishment and discuss fruitful directions for future research. (shrink)

How veridical is perception? Rather than representing objects as they actually exist in the world, might perception instead represent objects only in terms of the utility they offer to an observer? Previous work employed evolutionary modeling to show that under certain assumptions, natural selection favors such “strict‐interface” perceptual systems. This view has fueled considerable debate, but we think that discussions so far have failed to consider the implications of two critical aspects of perception. First, while existing models have explored single (...) utility functions, perception will often serve multiple largely independent goals. (Sometimes when looking at a stick you want to know how appropriate it would be as kindling for a campfire, and other times you want to know how appropriate it would be as a weapon for self‐defense.) Second, perception often operates in an inflexible, automatic manner—proving “impenetrable” to shifting higher‐level goals. (When your goal shifts from “burning” to “fighting,” your visual experience does not dramatically transform.) These two points have important implications for the veridicality of perception. In particular, as the need for flexible goals increases, inflexible perceptual systems must become more veridical. We support this position by providing evidence from evolutionary simulations that as the number of independent utility functions increases, the distinction between “interface” and “veridical” perceptual systems dissolves. Although natural selection evaluates perceptual systems only on their fitness, the most fit perceptual systems may nevertheless represent the world as it is. (shrink)

What are the criteria people use when they judge that other people did something intentionally? This question has motivated a large and growing literature both in philosophy and in psychology. It has become a topic of particular concern to the nascent field of experimental philosophy, which uses empirical techniques to understand folk concepts. We present new data that hint at some of the underly- ing psychological complexities of folk ascriptions of intentional action and at dis- tinctions both between diverse concepts (...) and between associated mechanisms. (shrink)

Recent research in moral psychology has attempted to characterize patterns of moral judgments of actions in terms of the causal and intentional properties of those actions. The present study directly compares the roles of consequence, causation, belief and desire in determining moral judgments. Judgments of the wrongness or permissibility of action were found to rely principally on the mental states of an agent, while judgments of blame and punishment are found to rely jointly on mental states and the causal connection (...) of an agent to a harmful consequence. Also, selectively for judgments of punishment and blame, people who attempt but fail to cause harm more are judged more leniently if the harm occurs by independent means than if the harm does not occur at all. An account of these phenomena is proposed that distinguishes two processes of moral judgment: one which begins with harmful consequences and seeks a causally responsible agent, and the other which begins with an action and analyzes the mental states responsible for that action. Ó 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. (shrink)

Scholars have long asserted that public relations (PR) professionals should play the role of organizational conscience, but little research has focused on why and how they play this role effectively. We found that PR professionals who played the role of organizational conscience had broadened conceptions of their roles and responsibilities, including a fervent duty to the public interest. This often put them in the position of providing criticism to powerful organizational players. Rather than raising their ethical concerns as persuasive orators, (...) they used subtle, resourceful, and experiential approaches to persuasion. Playing the role of organizational conscience typically necessitated gaining access to informal coalitions since access to dominant power coalitions often was limited or late. Organizations with participative cultures supported the role of organizational conscience. (shrink)

This paper explores the relationship between people's mental imagery for their experiences of paths and roads and the metaphorical use of path and road in discourse. We report the results of two studies, one a survey examining people's mental imagery about their embodied experiences with paths and roads, with the second providing a corpus analysis of the ways path and road are metaphorically used in discourse. Our hypothesis is that both people's mental imagery for path and road, and speakers' use (...) of these words in metaphorical contexts are strongly guided by their embodied understandings of real-world events related to travel on paths and roads. The results of these studies demonstrate how bodily experiences with artifacts partly constrains not only how specific conceptual metaphors emerge, but how different metaphorical understandings are applied in talk about abstract entities and events. (shrink)